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INTRODUCTION 
 
Cash is a major asset for business. Without 
the availability of cash, a company is unable 
to carry out its core activities such as 
operating, investing and financing. Cash 
Holding is the company's decision to 
determine how much cash and cash 
equivalents that it needs to possess in order 
to support the company's business activities. 
trade off theory advises companies to 
optimize cash holding by comparing the 
additional costs and benefits gained by cash 
holding (Keynes, 1936)  
There are a lot of factors affecting cash 
holding such as profitability (ROE), leverage 
(DAR), liquid asset substitute (NWC), capital 
expenditure (CAPEX), investment opportunity 
set (IOS), company size and dividend policy 
(Drobetz & Gruningen, 2007; Bates et al., 
2009; Kim et al., 2011; Al-Najjar, 2013; and 
Yang et al., 2017) 
This research was conducted because of 
the business phenomenon showed 
inconsistency of the data fluctuation (in 
increasing and decreasing) of cash holding 
(CH) variable value with other variables 
(ROE, DAR, NWC, CAPEX, SIZE, IOS, and 
DPR). Table 1 shows the differences in the 
results on the factors affecting cash holding 
and business phenomenon of non-conformity 
increase or decrease in value of cash holding 
by increasing or decreasing profitability, 
leverage, capital expenditure, liquid asset 
substitute, investment opportunity set, 
company size and dividend policy have made 
it necessary for doing a re-research related to 
these variables.               
Some previous studies also shown 
inconsistent results regarding the effect of 
profitability on cash holding. The research of 
Ogundipe et al (2012) showed profitability 
had a positive effect on cash holding, while 
Al-Najjar (2013) showed profitability had 
negative effect on cash holding, and Mesfin 
(2016) study showed profitability had no 
significant effect on cash holding.  
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Table 1. 
The Average of Non-Financial Enterprise Variables in the LQ 45 Index 
 
Variable 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Cshhold (x) 0.181 0.165 0.147 0.140 0.139 0.145 
Growth (%)  -8.79 -11.21 -4.82 -0.21 3.76 
DAR (x) 0.386 0.450 0.452 0.493 0.235 0.227 
Growth (%)  16.78 0.42 8.95 -5.04 -8.77 
ROE (x) 0.255 0.252 0.219 0.493 0.235 0.227 
Growth (%)  -1.20 -12.90 124.66 -52.37 3.07 
NWC (x) 0.0710 0.0470 0.0280 0.0161 0.0339 0.0252 
Growth (%)  -33.80 -40.43 -42.50 110.56 -25.66 
CAPEX (x) 0.099 0.073 0.087 0.089 0.076 0.049 
Growth (%)  -26.25 18.61 2.22 -14.86 -35.14 
SIZE (x) 30.657 30.433 30.707 30.649 30.615 30.851 
Growth (%)  0.73 0.90 -0.19 -0.11 0.77 
IOS (x) 2.608 2.775 2.592 3.487 3.227 3.297 
Growth (%)  2.18 -7.46 34.51 -6.57 6.37 
DPR (x) 0.402 0.507 0.439 0.397 0.455 0.514 
Growth (%)  20.92 -13.49 -9.48 14.54 12.89 
Reference: Secondary data, Processed (2018) 
Previous studies examined the effect of 
leverage on cash holding also found 
inconsistent findings. The research of 
Ogundipe et al (2012) showed leverage had 
a positive effect on cash holding, while 
Rizwan and Javeed (2011) and Belghitar and 
Khan (2013) showed leverage had negative 
effect on cash holding, and Kim et al (2011) 
study showed leverage had no significant 
effect on cash holding. 
Inconsistent results also found in studies 
examined the effect of capital expenditure on 
cash holding. The research of Wu et al 
(2016) showed capital expenditure had a 
positive effect on cash holding, while Bates et 
al (2009) and Belghitar and Khan (2013) 
showed profitability had negative effect on 
cash holding, and Khan and Tanver (2016) 
study showed capital expenditure had no 
significant effect on cash holding. 
Those inconsistent results of the effect of 
profitability, leverage, and capital expenditure 
on cash holding makes re-research is a 
necessary. The difference of this study 
compared to the previous research is laid 
within the use of dividend policy variables as 
moderating variables which moderate the 
effect of profitability, leverage, and capital 
expenditure on cash holding. 
Based on the inconsistency of research 
results on factors that affect cash holding and 
the existence of business phenomena that 
show inconsistencies in the fluctuation data 
(in increase and a decrease) in cash holding 
variables and other variables, therefore the 
the purpose of this study are: 1) analyze and 
provide empirical evidence of the effect of 
profitability on cash holding; 2) analyze and 
provide empirical evidence of the influence of 
leverage on cash holding; 3) analyze and 
provide empirical evidence of the influence of 
capital expenditure on cash holding; 4) 
analyze and provide empirical evidence of 
the influence of liquid asset substitute on 
cash holding; 5) analyze and provide 
empirical evidence of the effect of investment 
opportunity set (IOS) on cash holding; 6) 
analyze and provide empirical evidence of 
the influence of company size on cash 
holding; 7) analyzing and giving empirical 
evidence dividend policy moderates the effect 
of profitability on cash holding; 8) analyzing 
and giving empirical evidence dividend policy 
moderates the effect of leverage on cash 
holding; and 9) analyzing and giving empirical 
evidence dividend policy moderates the 
influence of capital expenditure on cash 
holding. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Trade off theory 
 
According to trade off theory (Miller & Orr, 
1966), a company need to consider the 
additional benefits and costs gained by cash 
holding. Additional benefits from cash holding 
activities described Keynes (1936) was about 
the transaction motive related to the funding 
of routine transactions and company 
operations. Furthermore, cash holding 
activities were required to address a higher 
opportunity costs due to low cash holding 
(Tahir et al., 2016). 
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A vigilant motive emphasized the 
possibility of overcoming high costs of using 
external funds to finance investments; 
therefore, a company needed to hold cash 
with sufficient or optimal amount. Speculation 
motive was related to the possibility of 
companies financing unexpected needs; 
large cash holdings would make the company 
able to avoid financial difficulties (Tahir et al., 
2016). 
Additional costs incurred due to cash 
holding would increase the cost of agency 
(Jensen, 1986). A company with very large 
amounts of cash did not need access to 
capital markets. Therefore the said company 
could not be closely monitored by regulatory 
and corporate stakeholders (Tahir et al, 
2016). As a result, managers would prioritize 
their personal interests above the interests of 
the owners of the company. This would lead 
to the company's performance becoming not 
optimal because of the opportunist attitude 
from the corporate managers. 
 
Pecking order theory 
 
Pecking Order Theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984) 
suggested that a company had a sequence in 
making funding decisions. First, companies 
should opt to use funds from internal 
companies. Second, the company should 
make adjustments to the amount of dividend 
payouts in the event of financial difficulties. 
The company would choose to sell its current 
assets at first. However, if that alternative 
was not sufficient, then the use of debt would 
become the next alternative until the sale of 
shares became the last funding option if the 
required funds were very large in number. 
This funding sequence came from 
information asymmetric theory and a 
manager must do well to minimize agency 
costs that arose from these funding 
problems. Manager is more aware of the 
condition of the company and has more 
knowledge in which investment is profitable 
for the company. Moreover, he or she is 
assumed to have the same goals as 
shareholdersso that he or she will seek to 
issue shares at the highest or maximum 
price. A capital market investor who fully 
understands this issue will demand a higher 
premium because of a higher risk due to 
information asymmetry. As a result, funding 
using stock equity became more expensive 
(Tahir, et al., 2016). For that reason, the 
company should choose to use debt at first. 
 
Agency theory 
 
The agency theory (Jensen, 2007) has the 
main notion that a shareholder acted as a 
principal authorized power to manager as an 
agent to organize firms in order to prospering 
the shareholders. Problems occurred 
because of a conflict of interest; that is, 
managers utilize shareholders’ confidence for 
self-profitable activities. Company-owned 
cash often led to conflicts between manager 
and shareholders, as managers are often 
inefficient in cash usage because they are 
used to finance low-return investments, but 
profitable for the manager himself.  
The manager preferred to save a lot of 
cash to increase control over the company's 
assets in order to gain advantage for his own 
(Tahir et al., 2016). A company with strong 
affiliations with banks preferred to keep a little 
cash (Ferreira & Viela, 2004). This action 
supported the existence of agency theory 
because manager with his authority had the 
ability to control the investment and financial 
decisions of the company. The use of debt 
could also reduce the conflicts of interest due 
to the company's cash (Jensen, 1986). Debt 
payments served as a force to discipline 
management’s actions; but in turn, the ability 
of the management to collect cash will be 
reduced due to increasing debt. 
 
The bird in the hand theory 
 
This theory was developed by Lintner (1962) 
which essentially implied that the dividend 
policy would increase the value of the 
company. This theory was based on the 
notion that investors tend to avoid risks and 
opted to earn current dividends if compared 
to receiving future dividends despite bigger 
dividends promised in the future. Dividend 
payouts were considered capable of reducing 
the uncertainty of stock investments by 
investors. The paid dividend had a higher 
certainty or had a lower risk compared to the 
uncertainty capital gain obtained from the 
increasing prices in stocks. Therefore, the 
company needs to target a dividend payout 
ratio on a certain amount in order to create 
maximum corporate value. 
 
Profitability and cash holding 
 
Pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984) 
stated that the company's funding sequence 
starting from the use of profits was withheld 
as a source of funding. A company's high 
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profitability showed that the company had a 
good performance. The earned profits would 
be accumulated with previous earnings that 
were deposited by the company in retained 
earnings. Therefore, the greater profitability 
the company had, the retained earnings 
would also increase. With the increase of the 
retained earnings, the company could save 
more cash to be used to fund the company's 
activities. Several previous studies (Ogundipe 
et al., 2012; Naoki., 2012, Al-Najjar, 2013; 
Kariukii et al, 2016) also showed that 
profitability had a positive effect on cash 
holding. 
 
H1: Profitability positively affects cash 
holding 
 
Leverage and cash holding 
 
Agency theory (Jensen, 2007) suggested that 
corporate managers tended to be 
opportunistic and thus use cash for 
unprofitable investments. As a result, the 
excess cash was used for things that were 
not efficient – therefore, necessary control 
was needed so that managers could invest 
optimally. One of many controls that can be 
done is to increase debt, because with the 
existence of debt, managers become more 
disciplined in managing cash – as cash is 
used to pay corporate liabilities. However, 
within a certain time, the company's cash will 
decrease due to the high amount of the 
company's debt so that more debt will lower 
cash holding. Some previous studies (Rizwan 
and Javeed, 2011; Lian et al, 2011; Belghitar 
and Khan, 2013; Mesfin, 2016; Al-Najjar and 
Clark, 2017) showed that Leverage 
negatively affected cash holding. 
 
H2: Leverage negatively affects cash 
holding 
 
Capital expenditure and cash holding 
 
Pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) has the 
notion that if the company's funding 
requirements were not able to close with 
retained earnings, then the company was 
advised to use debt as an alternative funding. 
Company with large fixed assets would find it 
easier to get debt because of the debt 
guarantees owned by the company. If the 
company could get debt easily, it was not 
necessary to save a lot of cash because its 
need of funding could be completed with 
debt. Therefore, cash owned could be 
invested for other things. That was why the 
more the company’s capital expenditure, 
there would be less cash that it needed to 
possess. Several previous studies (Bates et 
al., 2009; Rizwan & Javeed, 2011; Kim et al., 
2011; Wassiuzzaman, 2014) showed that 
capital expenditure negatively affected cash 
holding. 
 
H3: Capital expenditure negatively affects 
cash holding 
 
Liquid asset substitute and cash holding 
 
Keynes (1936) stated that one motive for 
holding cash was because of the transaction 
motive. The company's cash was used for 
financing activities or public transactions that 
were often done by the company. If the 
company's cash was sufficient to finance the 
company's activities, then the company's 
condition would be more stable. Therefore, 
as described by Miller and Orr in 1966, it 
became an additional benefit for the 
company. If the company's cash was 
insufficient, then other current assets might 
be used to meet its funding. Large working 
capital allowed a company to have less cash 
because the current assets component in 
working capital had enough liquid to be used 
to fund the company's activities. Some 
previous studies (Kim et al., 2011: 
Wassiuzzaman., 2014; Nadia, 2016; Wu et 
al., 2016) showed liquid asset substitute 
negatively affected cash holding. 
 
H4: Liquid asset substitute negatively 
affects cash holding 
 
The effect of investment opportunity 
set and cash holding 
 
The agency theory (Jensen, 1986) suggested 
that managers often made wastage of the 
company’s cash for their own benefit. 
Companies with a set of bad investment 
opportunities had a tendency to store large 
amounts of cash. This was caused because 
the managers’ opportunist attitude used cash 
to finance projects that were not worth the 
investment for their own personal gain. 
Several previous studies (Ferreira & Viella, 
2003; Gill & Shah, 2012; Islam, 2012) also 
suggested that investment opportunity set 
affected cash holding negatively.  
 
H5: Investment opportunity set negatively 
affects cash holding 
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Company size and cash holding 
 
Larger companies had easier way to finance 
their business activities. This could be 
possible because large companies have 
ability in economic scale that enabled them to 
do business more efficiently. As a result, 
these companies would only need less cash 
because they were able to utilize its 
economies of scale in accorandce with 
economies of scale theory (Miller & Orr, 
1966). Also, these large companies were also 
able to get external funding more easily. 
Several previous studies (Drobetz & 
Gruningen, 2007; Islam, 2012; Nadia, 2016; 
Wu et al., 2016) showed that company size 
negatively affected Cash Holding. 
 
H6: Company size negatively affects cash 
holding 
 
The moderating role of dividend policy 
in the relationship between 
profitability, leverage, capital 
expenditure and cash holding 
 
Dividend policy is a policy to determine how 
much net profit is to be distributed to 
investors in the form of dividends. Bird in the 
hand theory (Lintner., 1962) stated that 
companies needed to divide up large 
amounts of dividends in order to increase the 
value of their companies as investors 
basically preferred dividends that provided 
certainty rather than an uncertain increase in 
stock prices. As a result, the company that 
divided large amounts of cash would lose a 
lot of cash and the amount of Cash Holding 
would be scant. Several previous studies 
(Bates et al., 2009 and Wu et al., 2016) 
showed that dividend policies have a 
negative effect on Cash Holding. 
Pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 
1984) claimed that a company would use its 
internal cash at first to fund its business 
activities – therefore the company that could 
generate huge profits would save more cash. 
In funding its activities – this included in 
paying dividends to investors, the company 
would use its own internal cash. As a result, 
the amount of cash generated from the 
profitability of the company would be reduced 
as the internal cash was used to pay 
dividends to investors. However, even if the 
company's cash was reduced, this action 
would make investors more prosperous and 
happy, and would lead to a result where the 
value of the company got increased. 
The agency theory (Jensen, 1986) stated 
that a manager tended to be opportunistic; so 
a necessary control was needed to keep the 
manager from wasting the company's cash. 
The control mechanism that Jensen meant 
was with the use of Leverage and dividend 
payouts. By using both ways, the manager 
would be more controlled in using the 
company's cash, because the cash held first 
used to pay the debt and interest; and would 
be distributed for the prosperity of investors in 
the form of dividends. Therefore with the 
policy of dividend payouts, it would further 
strengthen the negative effect of debt 
towards cash holding owned by the company. 
When the amount of cash owned by the 
company was not excessive, it could 
automatically be a mechanism for disciplining 
corporate managers in managing the existing 
cash. 
Jani et al (2004) by using pecking order 
theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984), stated that a 
company with multiple capital expenditures or 
investments would collect substantial cash to 
meet this objective which was related to the 
expenditure on fixed assets of the company. 
 
Table 2. 
Comparison Beetween the Stocks Index of LQ 45 and Shares in IDX 
 
Market Capitalization (trillion) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
The stocks in LQ 45 2332.7 2552.3 2539.9 3337.4 2953.1 3796.3 
Total shares in IDX 3537.3 4127 4219 4774.3 4872.7 5753.6 
Market Capitalization stocks in LQ 45 (%) 65.9% 61.8% 60.2% 69.9% 60.6% 66.0% 
Transaction Value (trillion) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
The value of stocks transactions LQ 45 
Index 
899.5 766.1 914.3 894.9 933.6 1321 
The value of stocks transactions in IDX 1223.4 1116.1 1522.1 1453.4 1406.3 1844.6 
The value of stocks transactions LQ 45 
Index (%) 
73.5% 68.6% 60.1% 61.6% 66.4% 71.6% 
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Therefore, the company's internal cash that 
had been collected would be eroded to fund 
the acquisition of the company's fixed assets 
and the company would rely on debt as an 
alternative to funding other things aside from 
internal cash. This saying was in accorandce 
with the statement of Bates et al (2009) which 
claimed that if a company had a lot of fixed 
assets; it would increase its debt level 
because the fixed assets could be used as 
debt guarantees. In addition, the company 
who had paid dividends would also 
experience a decrease in the amount of cash 
owned (Al-Najjar, 2013). If the company 
made a lot of fixed assets, there would be 
less cash. 
 
H7: The existence of a dividend policy 
moderates the effect of profitability on 
cash holding 
 
H8: The existence of a dividend policy 
moderates the effect of leverage on cash 
holding 
 
H9: The existence of a dividend policy 
moderates the influence of capital 
expenditure on cash holding 
 
METHODS  
 
This study used the population of companies 
listed on the LQ 45 Index during the period 
2011-2016.  Table 2 shows the reasons for 
choosing the LQ 45 Index as sample in this 
research. In 2016, the stock market 
capitalization in the LQ 45 Index reached 
66% of the total market capitalization of the 
shares. The LQ 45 Index's share value in 
2016 reached 71.6% of the total value of 
stock transactions on the IDX. Therefore, LQ 
45 Indexes had become one of the favorite 
stocks for investors and was able to become 
the prime mover of Indonesia Composite 
Index (IDX).  
 
Table 3. 
Measurements 
 
Variable Measurements Reference 
Cash  
Holding  
(CH) 
CH =  Cash and cash 
equivalents / total assets 
Al-Najjar 
and Clark 
(2017) 
Profitability 
(ROE) 
ROE = net income (EAT) / 
total equity 
Foster 
(1986) 
Leverage 
(DAR) 
DAR = total amount of debt 
/ total assets 
Foster 
(1986) 
Liquid  
Asset 
Substitute 
(NWC) 
NWC = (current assets- 
current liabilities - cash and 
cash equivalents) / total 
assets  
Bates et 
al. (2009) 
Investment 
Opportunity  
Set (MBVA) 
MBVA = [Assets-equity+ 
(outstanding share x closing 
price)] / total assets 
Kim et al. 
(2009) 
Capital 
Expenditures 
(CAPEX) 
CAPEX = [fixed assets (t) - 
depreciation expense (t) – 
fixed assets (t-1)] / total 
assets 
Bates et 
al. (2009) 
Firm 
 Size  
(SIZE) 
SIZE = Ln Total assets Kim et al. 
(2011) 
Dividend 
Policy (DPR) 
DPR = dividend per share / 
earnings per share 
Foster 
(1986) 
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Purposive sampling method was used to 
determine the sample in this study. We 
managed to get 108 observations which had 
met the criteria for determining observation 
and the criteria of classical assumption in 
multiple regression tests. The data used is 
secondary data obtained from the company's 
financial statements and use panel data 
(Financial statements of several companies 
during the 2011-2016 period). Financial 
reports are obtained from IDX's official 
website.  
As presented in Table 3, measurement of 
cash holding refer to Al-Najjar and Clark 
(2017), while profitability, dividend policy, and 
leverage refer to Foster (1986). Measurement 
developed by Bates et al. (2009) used as a 
proxy of liquid asset substitute and capital 
expenditures. To measure IOS and firm size, 
we use measurement developed by Kim et al. 
(2011).  
Our study used two regression models. 
The first regression model was used to test 
the first until the sixth hypothesis. The second 
regression model was used to test the 
moderating role dividend policy in the 
seventh hypothesis. The models used in this 
study is developed as follows: 
 
CH= β1 ROE + β2 DAR + β3 IOS+ β4 NWC + 
β5 CAPEX + β6 SIZE + e (Model 1) 
 
CH= β1 ROE + β2 DAR + β3 IOS + β4 NWC 
+ β5 CAPEX + β6 SIZE + β7DPR + 
β8ROE*DPR + β9DAR*DPR + 
β10CAPEX*DPR+  e (Model 2) 
 
Where CH = cash holding, ROE = return 
on equity, DAR = debt to equity ratio, IOS = 
investment opportunity set, NWC = liquid 
asset substitute, CAPEX = capital 
expenditure, SIZE = company size, DPR = 
dividend payout ratio. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Table 4 present descriptive statistics of the 
sample consisted of 108 observations which 
had met the requirements of classical 
assumption testing (normality testing, 
multicolinearity, heteroedasticity and 
autocorrelation). Then the data that had met 
the classical assumption test would be used 
as a sample for hypothesis testing. From 
table 4, it is known that the average value of 
CH is 0.162. This means that the average 
amount of cash and cash equivalents of a 
sample company is 16.2% of total assets.  
Table 4. 
Results of Hypothesis Testing 
 
Indep Var 
Common effect  Fixed effect  Random effect  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
ROE 0.414*** 0.217*** 0.157** 0.093** 0.003*** 0.0001** 
 
0.000  0.007 0.032 0.048 0.000 0.018 
DAR -0.175** -0.212*** -0.207*** -0.318*** -0.163** -0.255** 
 
0.024 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.044 0.002 
CAPEX -0.187** -0.421** -0.195* -0.223* -0.215** -0.263** 
 
0.036 0.016 0.054 0.085 0.026 0.033 
NWC -0.214 -0.007 0.015 -0.004 0.014 -0.0004 
 
0.831 0.864 0.241 0.885 0.278 0.839 
IOS -1.931 -0.062 -0.017 -0.021 -0.0005 -0.004 
 
0.156 0.329 0.345 0.205 0.142 0.363*** 
SIZE -0.902* -0.053* -0.142* -0.343* 0.0006 -0.003 
 
0.068 0.057 0.078 0.064 0.254 0.399 
DPR 
 
-0.067* 
 
-0.012** 
 
0.015 
  
0.072 
 
0.035 
 
0.394 
ROE*DPR 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.007* 
 
-0.008* 
  
0.312 
 
0.087 
 
0.081 
DAR*DPR 
 
-0.008* 
 
-0.083*** 
 
-0.09*** 
  
0.084 
 
0.003 
 
0.003 
CAPEX*DPR 
 
-0.021** 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.011* 
  
0.038 
 
0.162 
 
0.09 
Std error 0.082 0.104 0.046 0.005 0.058 0.048 
Adj R 0.207 0.142 0.751 0.823 0.267 0.321 
F-test 5.68*** 3.76***   15.03*** 12.54*** 7.52*** 5.86*** 
Reference: Secondary Data, Processed 2018 
Depend Variable : Cash Holding (CH) 
***,**,*significant at 1%,5%,10% 
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First equation model 
 
Fixed effect model is the best model for the 
first and second regression equation, which is 
shown from the significance of the chow test 
of 0,000 and also significant with hausmann 
test. The value of adjusted R2 in first model is 
0.751. It shows that Independent variable in 
first model are able to explain the cash 
holding value of 75.1%, and the rest is 
explained by other variables outside the 
model. The value of F-test is 15.03 and 
significant at level 1%. It shows that 
independent variables in the first model 
simultaneously affect the value of cash 
holding and it can be concluded that the first 
model has been decent (goodness of fit). We 
know that beta: 
 
CH= 0.157ROE – 0.207DAR – 0.195CAPEX – 
0.015NWC – 0.017IOS – 0.142SIZE     
 
Second equation model 
 
The value of adjusted R2 in second model is 
0.823. It shows that the variable ROE, DAR, 
CAPEX, IOS, NWC, SIZE, DPR, DPR*ROE, 
DPR*DAR, and DPR*CAPEX are able to 
explain the cash holding value of 82.3%, and 
the test is explained by other variables 
outside the model. The value of F-test is 
0.000 and significant at level 1%. It shows 
that independent variables in second 
equation  simultaneously affect the value of 
cash holding, and it can be concluded that 
the second model has been decent 
(goodness of fit). From the second model 
testing we know that beta value of 
standardized residual in this research is: 
 
CH= 0.093ROE – 0.318DAR – 0.223CAPEX – 
0.004 NWC – 0.021 IOS – 0.343 SIZE – 
0.012DPR – 0.007 DPR*ROE – 0.083 
DPR*DAR – 0.004 DPR*CAPEX    
 
Discussion  
 
The best model in this study uses the fixed 
effect  (Table 5-9), so the discussion of the 
hypothesis will use the results of the fixed 
effect test model in table 4. The Chow test 
results show a p-value of 0,000 (significant at 
1%) and the Hausmann test results show a p-
value of 0.04 (significant at the 5% level) so 
that fixed effect is the best model in the 
regression model of this study.  
 
 
 
Table 5. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Min  Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
CH 108 0.01 0.59 0.17 0.11 
ROE 108 1.24 52.43 17.3 10.52 
DAR 108 0.13 0.83 0.39 0.16 
CAPEX 108 0.002 0.51 0.08 0.07 
NWC 108 -0.16 5.93 0.38 0.99 
IOS 108 0.01 32.84 5.67 9.51 
SIZE 108 -0.19 33.24 27.17 10.12 
DPR 108 6.54 87.86 41.7 17.55 
Source: Secondary data, processed 2018  
 
 
Table 6. 
Chow Test (First Regression Model) 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests 
Equation: Untitled 
Test cross-section fixed effects 
Effects Test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-
section F 
13.958076 (17.84) 0.0000 
Cross-
section Chi -
square 
144.884043 17 0.0000 
 
 
 
Table 7. 
Hausman Test (First Regression Model) 
 
Correlated Random Effects-Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled 
Test cross-section random effects 
Test 
Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic 
Chi-Sq. 
d.f. 
Prob. 
Cross-
section 
random 
12.700523 (17.84) 0.0480 
 
 
Table 8. 
Chow Test (Second Regression Model) 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests 
Equation: Untitled 
Test cross-section fixed effects 
Effects Test Statistic d.f. Prob. 
Cross-
section F 
13.971893 (17.80) 0.0000 
Cross-
section Chi -
square 
148.880272 17 0.0000 
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Table 9. 
Hausman Test (Second Regression Model) 
 
Correlated Random Effects-Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled 
Test cross-section random effects 
Test 
Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic 
Chi-Sq. 
d.f. 
Prob. 
Cross-
section 
random 
20.070490 10 0.0286 
 
Table 4 shows that profitability (ROE) has 
a positive effect on cash holding and 
significance at level 5%. This finding in line 
with pecking order theory (Myers, 1984); 
which stated that the company would use 
retained earnings as the first funding 
alternative. Therefore when the company has 
a large profit, then the profit will be saved and 
accumulated into retained earnings so that 
the cash will also be increased; thus, 
hypothesis 1 is supported. 
Leverage (DAR) has a negative effect on 
cash holding and significance at level 1%. 
This is in accordance with agency theory 
(Jensen, 1986); which claimed that debt 
could be a control mechanism against the 
opportunistic behavior of managers in 
managing cash. With the existence of debt, 
the company has an obligation to pay interest 
expense and loan principal so that the cash 
owned by the company will be reduced to pay 
off the said obligation. We can conclude that 
hypothesis 2 in this study is supported. 
Capital expenditure (CAPEX) has 
negative effect upon Cash Holding and 
significance at level 10%. This result is in 
accordance with Pecking Order Theory 
(Myers, 1984); which stated that if the 
company's internal funds were insufficient, 
debt could be used as the second funding 
source. The theory further claimed that a 
company with large fixed assets would find it 
easier to obtain debt because their fixed 
assets could be used as collateral for the 
company's debts. As a result, the company 
that bought a lot of fixed assets did not need 
to have a lot of cash with them because they 
could use debt as a source of funding. We 
can conclude that hypothesis 3 in this study 
is supported. 
Liquid asset substitute (NWC) has not 
significant effect on cash holding. This result 
is not accordance with trade off Theory (Miller 
& Orr, 1966); which suggested that a 
company needed to weigh in the benefits and 
costs of storing cash. One of the benefits of 
storing cash related transaction motive was 
that the cash itself was used to fund general 
transactions of the company. If the company 
had current assets other than large cash, 
they did not need to save too much cash 
because the current assets other than cash 
could easily be converted into cash that could 
be used by the company. We can conclude 
that hypothesis 4 in this study is not 
supported. The most plausible reason these 
finding is because companies with large 
liquid asset substitutes (account receivables 
and inventories) do not necessarily have a 
little cash because the company could have 
cash from debt, sales of fixed assets or 
because of a low dividend payout ratio. In 
addition, the standard deviation value of the 
NWC variable is very high at 0.99 so that it 
exceeds the average value of 0.38 which 
indicates the NWC has no significant effect 
on cash holding  
Investment opportunity set has not 
significant effect on cash holding.This result 
is not in line with agency theory (Jensen, 
1986); which stated that corporate managers 
tend to use corporate cash for waste; so that 
when they saw a set of bad investment 
opportunities, they tend to keep large sums of 
cash. This was because managers would use 
the funds for inappropriate investments that 
only benefit them personally without 
increasing the value of the company. We can 
conclude that hypothesis 5 in this study is not 
supported. IOS is an external variable whose 
value is determined by the market through 
the company's stock price, this is the reason 
the fifth hypothesis is rejected because the 
company's cash determination policy is not 
determined by the stock market conditions 
that have high fluctuations 
Firm size has a negative effect on cash 
holding and significance at level 10%. This is 
in accordance with economies of scale theory 
(Miller & Orr, 1966); which stated that large 
companies had economies of scale ability 
that made their operations became more 
efficient. As a result, large companies did not 
need to save a lot of cash because they were 
able to run business activities more 
efficiently; and the existing cash could be 
used for other profitable investments.We can 
conclude that hypothesis 6 in this study is 
supported.  
In this study, dividend policy can be a 
moderating variable which role gets 
weakened the positive effect of profitability on 
cash holding. This can be seen from the 
value of the initial regression coefficient of 
ROE to cash holding of 0.093. However, 
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when ROE is interacted with the dividend 
policy, the regression coefficient value drops 
to -0.007, the total effect is 
0.01(0.093+0.007). The existence of dividend 
policy can be reduce the positive effect of 
ROE from 0.093 to -0.007. 
Dividend policy also can be a moderating 
variable which role gets strenghten the 
negative effect of Leverage on cash holding. 
Companies that have a lot of debt will have 
less cash, the amount of cash held will 
decrease when the company decides to 
distribute dividends to shareholders The 
coefficient regretion of leverage on cash 
holding is -0.318 and the existence of 
dividend policy as moderating variable can 
change the coefficient regression to -0.083, 
so the total effect is -0.401 (-0.212-0.083). 
However, dividend policy can’t be a 
moderating variable in the correlation of 
capital expenditure and cash holding. It can 
be seen the significance of t variable 
CAPEX*DPR in fixed effect model which is 
the interaction of capital expenditure variable 
and dividend policy of 0.216 is not significant. 
Purchasing fixed assets does not have to use 
large amounts of company money, 
companies can borrow banks or use funding 
from the capital market to meet their funding. 
In addition, the company could only rent fixed 
assets to fulfill its operations so that the costs 
incurred would be less. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
This study examined the factors that 
determined the companies’ cash holding 
listed in LQ 45 Index during 2011-2016 by 
adding a moderation variable of dividend 
policy as the novelty of the study. The results 
showed that dividend policy could be a 
moderating variable that weakened the 
positive influence of profitability on cash 
holding and strengthened the negative impact 
of leverage on cash holding.  
The findings of this study further 
strengthen trade off theory, pecking order 
theory and agency theory in explaining the 
factors that could affect cash holding. For 
managers to earn a substantial cash holding 
rate, companies should strive to generate 
maximum net profits because the cash 
earned from the company's earnings will be 
retained for internal company. This is 
because retained earnings that can be used 
to fund the main business activity of the 
company as suggested by pecking order 
theory. If the companies’ cash is in excessive 
amounts, then it is prone to be abused by 
managers for their own interests. Therefore, 
the amount of existing cash needs to be 
reduced by using the mechanism of debt or 
dividend payments because both debt and 
dividends are statistically proven to be able to 
reduce the amount of cash significantly. 
This research has several limitations such 
as: The sample of this study. The researcher 
used LQ 45 index which consisted of many 
sectors; while for each industry, sector may 
have different levels of cash holding because 
there are several sectors whose business 
activities are dependent on the exchange 
rate, commodity prices and others. 
Furthermore, this study only used financial 
data and did not include the variable of good 
corporate governance as the determining 
factor of cash holding; while cash holding 
policy is also made and determined by 
directors, independent commissioners, and 
risk management committees. 
Based on the limitations of the research 
described above, the upcoming research 
agenda is for researchers to use more 
specific sectors. For instance, mining 
companies, agriculture, infrastructure, 
manufacturing and other companies because 
each sector has its own peculiarities in 
determining the amount of its cash holding 
and includes the variable good corporate 
governance such as managerial ownership, 
the number of independent commissioners, 
risk management committee and others. 
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